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ABSTRACT The research provides a two-type analysis of the consequences of the COVID-19 
pandemic on the global world order after 2020. The first dimension of analysis is oriented 
towards geopolitical parameters, while the second is based on the geo-economic consequences 
of the pandemic crisis. The authors identified and classified three types of geopolitical games in 
the international community: the game of non-movement and labeling; the game of vaccine racing 
and the game of securitization. Furthermore, the goal is to identify potential consequences for 
the economy of certain countries, but also the postulates of international political economy 
due to the contemporary geographical, political and economic patterns of behavior in a global 
pandemic crisis. The main thesis is aimed at confirming predictable and common patterns 
of behavior that are accompanied by tested mechanisms of attempts to exercise power in the 
international community (classical geopolitical power games in the new conditions). The aim 
of this paper is to develop scenarios of potential changes in power relations at the global level 
and to analyse the consequences with regard to the outcomes of the three mentioned games. 
Scenario analysis is a common geopolitical qualitative method most commonly used to assess 
risk in different spheres of society. Large corporations are using it most often in calculat-
ing financial fluctuations in business processes and decision-making, but it also appears in a 
number of projections in industrial-technological processes and in American institutes. The 
methodology is similar in the cases of financial scenario analysis, while in other social sciences 
(primarily geopolitics and security studies) it is about discovering potential and alternative 
worlds. In geopolitics, it serves to project potential developments in the global environment 
with regard to the creation of new world orders, and phenomena that can change the predicted 
outcomes of reality. While analyses of new world orders can also be attributed to methods of 
prediction in international relations; in contrast, scenario analyses are more than forecasts of 
developments based on past trends. They primarily include considerations of unpredictable 
factors or reversals in international relations, where a global pandemic is certainly one of them.
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1. Introduction
The concept of Human Security has become the key security perspective in contem-
porary world. The linkage between personal security of an individual (or perceived 
personal security) and global security challenges seemed to be even more visible during 
the pandemic crisis in 2020. Nevertheless, such notion will be analysed and explained 
in a frame of three ongoing geopolitical games in international community identified 
and categorized by the authors. There is one working hypothesis connected to each 
game and the main goal is to discuss new paradigms of security, subjectivity and state 
role in the so-called New Global World Order we are potentially facing. The concept of 
New World Order arises in IR literature repeatedly after the major historical events that 
shattered the known balance of power in international community. Authors use such 
a concept trying to define new power relations in the current era after a concrete event 
that might influence global order (Freedman, 1991; Nye, 1992; Slaughter 1997). The 
term was often used to predict major changes in near future or great changes between 
major powers (Huntington, 1998). The term is also used by conspiracy theorists in 
the context of secret society ruling the World with the help of major international 
monetary organizations (Knock, 2019). Since the end of Cold War World Orders in-
troduced by both “academics and practitioners have advanced a variety of concepts for 
a new ‘world order’. These include a brief flirtation with a unipolar world/ American 
Empire (more recently, a Pax Sinica); a G2 ‘directorate’ run by China and the United 
States; major power ‘spheres of influence’; balance of power approaches; a multipolar 
arrangement of the world’s larger powers; an ideological consortium of like-minded 
states (concert of democracies); and transnational networks led by non-state actors.” 
(Steinberg, 2020: 551-552)
Regardless of former usage of the term, its controversies and forms, the New Normal 
concept introduced during the pandemic crisis call upon the revision and analysis of 
potential changes in international community as well as scenarios for power shifts that 
may be introduced by the New Global World Order in the New Normal circumstances. 
In the book “COVID-19 and World Order”, edited by Hal Brands and Francis J. 
Gavin (2020) the term World Order is being commonly used. Due to the ambiguity of 
previous usage of the term New World Order (being introduced every five to ten years 
by pompous and world-as-we-know-it-ending thesis), and due to the fact that the 
authors in this paper consider changes in the very essence of existing world order, the 
term post-COVID global order will be introduced and used for the explanation of po-
tential changes in world power relations. Those changes are oriented towards the shift 
in already ongoing geopolitical realms: new globalization nexus; new subjectivity and 
fragmentation of power – distribution among actors other than states (Zorko, 2018). 
The key research questions are related to the analysis of new geopolitical games as a 
consequence of the pandemic crisis and pandemic related globalization of (in)security; 
new subjectivity emerged because of the pandemic; and state actions that resulted in the 






















change of power due to the pandemic. As Brands and Gavin (2020: 15) stated “while 
this disease, thankfully, is not likely to claim as many lives as the period from 1939 
to 1945 did, its impacts on the global economy, on democracy, on public health, 
on food security, and on governance will reverberate for years to come.” This pa-
per focuses on impacts that this pandemic crisis might generate in global order and 
power relations taking into account abovementioned disruptions. Brands and Gavin 
(2020) are oriented towards the COVID-19 influence in issues of public health and 
climate change, international institutions and great power rivalry. However, this paper 
is oriented towards the visions of change in the global order, both between rivals and 
allies as well as in the system itself (with an emphasis on the concepts of territory, 
sovereignty, solidarity, autarchy, and global economy). The importance of critical geo-
political analysis of COVID-19 related consequences to world order lies in the fact 
that ongoing relations in international community tend towards competition, rather 
than cooperation. Competition in the form of identified geopolitical games will be 
proven to be more subtle than traditional geopolitical and geostrategic wars of the 
past, including new types of players and new values worth fighting for. Nevertheless, 
existing geographical patterns of political reasoning and acting are rooted in geopo-
litical culture and imaginations of involved subjects. As US journalist Tom McTague 
giving his future scenarios stated, “beyond the epidemiological challenges lies a slowly 
amassing threat that is not pathological in nature, but economic, political, and mili-
tary. This is the geopolitical second wave, and its power is already starting to concern 
Western leaders”. (The Atlantic, www.theatlantic.com, 9/24/2020). Indeed, right now, 
the geopolitical games of the pandemic crisis are making the World go round. There-
fore, theoretical framework of critical geopolitical analysis, primarily in the areas of 
practical and popular geopolitics, will be used to demystify geographical patterns and 
power relations beyond COVID-19 geopolitical reasoning and games. 
The first geopolitical game that influences future relations between states (and/or 
blocks of states) is related to the politics and policy of (non) movement. The first re-
action to COVID-19 for the most states in the world was border closure. Such mecha-
nisms of strong(er) border control or even completely closed borders have had its 
exceptions. Such imparities that will be further elaborated showed the paradox of the 
mechanism itself, as well as selective approach due to the nature of bilateral relations 
(moreover the perception of the quality of relations) between states. Another mecha-
nism of COVID-19 related geopolitical game is red flagging. Red lists of COVID-19 
influenced countries in day to day reports left mark on their international reputation, 
but even more important, left an imprint on their tourism attractiveness and potential 
business activity. No-go areas that are used as terminology of conflicts entered tourism 
perceptions of safe and unsafe places and areas. So-called COVID-19 passports makes 
this a two-way process – there will be admissible and non-admissible travelers depend-
ing on the status of vaccination. Bearing in mind shortages in some countries, long 
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deeper gaps between wealthy and poor nations and even privileged individuals. Finally, 
the third mechanism in the first geopolitical game of creating and writing spaces of 
insecurity and movement is labeling. China’s virus, or Wuhan virus is the example how 
the theory of constructivism is applied in contemporary International Relations. Geo-
graphical victim blaming process on the global level influenced global power relations 
and daily re-territorialization of virus positive and virus negative space(s). The second 
strain of virus both in practical and popular geopolitical reasoning called Brazilian, 
South-African or U.K. strain confirmed this practice in public space.
The second geopolitical game is related to research, development and distribution 
of vaccine for COVID-19. As Asleigh Furlong (2020) quoted Suerie Moon (co-di-
rector of the Graduate Institute Geneva’s Global Health Centre), countries that are 
on the breach of vaccine development do not have only “strategic assets, but power 
of military weapons; having access to a vaccine is a chance to strengthen a country’s 
allegiances, political standing and prestige” (www.politico.eu, 7/29/2020). Indeed, 
shortly after the announcement of safe vaccine development the games of distribu-
tion began. The scenarios of potential vaccine development and distribution mirror 
current global power relations, influence and geographical presence, and may induce 
changes in regional/world order, especially in the area of economy. The competition 
between states in purchase, vaccine rollout, its benefits on state economy and tourism, 
(non)diversification of sources of supply, potential places of vaccine manufacturing 
leads towards the third geopolitical game – the game of securitization. Security is-
sues with global outreach such as uncontrolled irregular migrations, pandemics, cli-
mate changes, environmental challenges, resource scarcity, are still being perceived 
as national security threats. They are being securitized trough national policies and 
politics leaving the space for international competition in the process of addressing 
those issues. 
All three types of geopolitical games induced by pandemics have the power to change 
current world order, have the ability to influence bilateral (and multilateral) relations, 
have the possibility to construct new geographical reasoning both in IR and everyday 
life of individuals, and buster new kinds of subjectivity and further fragmentation of 
power in international community. Geo-economics and geopolitical analysis are used 
to describe three potential scenarios for post-COVID-19 World Order possibilities and 
parameters in its potential development. Scenario analysis is a qualitative method 
often used in geopolitics for the predictions of phenomena that could change realities 
and established relations. Therefore, instead of a conclusion, the main points of this 
paper are being explained trough potential scenarios for changes in global order, its 
causes and consequences.






















2. COVID-19 related geopolitical games with economic consequences
2.1. First geopolitical game – new types of territorialization: The concept of  
       space and movement in a pandemic environment
The first geopolitical game is the one about space(s) and movement. In history, ter-
ritory has been the most important tool for power games. Territorial expansion, re-
source wars, exploitation, and colonialism made great powers of the past rise and de-
cline. Nowadays, territory poses as a pillar of sovereignty and a state asset. Power that 
could be gained trough territorial practices is oriented towards economic benefits (e.g. 
trade, transport or tourism). For such business perspective hard borders and border 
controls pose a serious issue and multiple potential economic loss. The abolition of 
the Schengen Agreement in Europe and closing borders all around the World, due to 
the pandemic crisis, challenged the usual chains of supply and interfered with estab-
lished market relations. There is a documented “unprecedented shutdown of borders 
all around the world and restrictions on migration (91% of the global population 
live in countries with restrictions on international arrivals, 39% in countries with 
completely closed borders)” (Akkerman, 2020:1). Also, Lara-Valencia et. all (2020: 
1) documented estimated reduction “of at least 80% in cross-border travel” of border 
experts “in their country of residence”. A wall-building phenomenon along borders 
worldwide continues. Even more, COVID-19 comes handy in need of explanation 
of such practice in public sphere. Mark Akkerman (2020:1) finds that “amidst the 
pandemic, EU, US, Australia and others have continued to pour billions into fortify-
ing borders, strengthening border patrol agencies (CBP, Frontex) and funding often 
authoritarian third countries to stop migration reaching their shores.” 
Lessons learned out of non-movement politics introduced in the pandemic crisis by 
border control policies may be defined as small changes with big consequences. It 
is not the first time that some of the border practices changed and border policies 
have gotten harder. But it is the first time that border closings have become the first 
recognized mechanism in fighting a disease globally. Global lockdown harvested tour-
ist areas and made some services, for instance travel and fine dining, surplus. Andre 
Ishii noticed that both “locally-based industries have been devastated as well as globe-
spanning industries, such as airline and tourism, which have been forecasted to suffer 
for years, with more layoffs to come” (www.geopoliticalmonitor.com, 6/2/2020). But 
each country has something to lose in this sector, so the question is, where does a 
geopolitical game take place in this example? Geographical patterns of (non) move-
ment during the pandemic were (and still are) noticeable in selective border closing. 
Either in a sense of being selective towards neighboring countries (e.g. Croatia during 
the time of elections); being selective towards specific goods and services (e.g. export, 
import, transit); and being selective towards different groups of people (e.g. differ-
ent protocol for different passports at those closed borders, not to mention migrant 
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to COVID-19 could be summarized in one question: how come if closed borders is a 
functioning mechanism and people are not travelling that the Virus still finds its way 
to travel? Or as a meme circulating on Internet has pointed out: 2020 – the year that 
the Virus travelled more than you did. As safe vaccine was developed, the question of 
travelling re-entered the global scene. “Immunity passports” or “risk-free certificates” 
(WHO, 2020a) are not yet approved by the World Health Organization which “para-
doxically, signed an agreement with Estonia in October to collaborate on the develop-
ment of a digital vaccination certificate - or a smart yellow card” (www.euronews.com, 
2/3/2021). Nevertheless, countries such as Cyprus, Hungary, Iceland introduced free 
travel documents for vaccinated persons, with ten more EU member states announced 
to follow such practice (www.schengenvisainfo.com, 2/4/2021). Similar number of 
countries around the world are accepting vaccinated tourists without testing upon 
arrival and/or quarantine. There is even a consensus being reached on the EU level 
for introducing COVID-19 passports. This idea opens numerous questions due to 
the fact that only three types of vaccinations have been approved in the EU. Will 
COVID-19 passports with Sputnik V or China’s vaccines be equal to Western ones? Is 
travelling in the future depending on the similarity of rules, but ideology as well? And, 
how will the new geographical patterns influence disobedient European countries and 
the not yet integrated parts of the European continent? Along with its controversies 
“vaccine passports are already becoming a mainstream idea. At the end of November, 
Australian carrier Qantas, for instance, became one of the first airlines to publically 
announce that they would only allow vaccinated passengers on board its flights in 
future” (www.euronews.com, 2/3/2021). 
Space represents much more than just territory surrounded by borders. It consists of 
spatial practices related to territory, especially those of labeling and constructs. Hence 
geopolitical game related to territory is also the one of (non) selective red-flagging and 
labeling. Territorialization and re-territorialization of Virus positive and Virus negative 
Space is a circular process happening at political level and being accompanied and 
multiplied trough the mediatization and presentation of (un)safe spaces and vice-versa. 
The red lists of Virus infected countries change on daily basis influencing state econo-
mies, individual travel plans and an international (tourist) image of a particular coun-
try. Nevertheless, red-flagging does not depend solely on the numbers or statistics: it 
is a game of love and hate in IR as well. 
And while red-flagging in Europe depends on particular interests and short-term coali-
tions of quid pro quo actions, globally it triggers the rise of competition among ideo-
logically contested blocks in the seek for global domination. Benn Steil argues for 
the United States to consider the two worlds approach it took during the Cold War 
but this time against China (Steil, 2020). Such order “means limiting reliance on 
the authoritarian world while deepening American integration with other democra-
cies.” (Brands and Gavin, 2020: 36). Something Elisabeth Economy (2020: 739) calls 






















“Cold War 2.0”, is already visible in mutual victims blaming the process between 
USA and China. Bilateral labeling in media and political speeches implies a contest 
of who is more to blame for the current pandemic situation. The terms China’s Virus 
or Wuhan Virus as well as China’s assertive politics around the pandemic, show how 
the theory of constructivism functions in everyday political practice. Even more, Nail 
Ferguson (2020: 819) implies that Cold War II (as he calls it) is not a new phenom-
enon but merely an intensified one due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and at the same 
time a phenomenon that revealed “its existence to those who last year doubted it was 
happening.” 
Finally, geopolitics of (non)movement seeks for re-definition of globalization pro-
cesses as we understand them. The notions of unequal globalization are not new ones. 
Czempiel (1999) stated twenty years ago that globalization is in its merit regional; The 
Lisbon Group in 1997 introduced the term of triadization as an uneven globalization 
happening primarily on the nexus between the Western world and tight relations be-
tween north America, west Europe and Japan (The Lisbon Group, 1997). Sassen in 
2002 went even beyond theories of globalized national states in privileged geographi-
cal areas and introduced globalization activities and interconnections among world 
cities as carriers of globalization processes (Sassen, 2002). Nevertheless, that entire 
state-of-the-art only introduced the ongoing trends that the pandemic crisis proved 
happening in practice.
Newly discovered terms of de-globalization; over-globalization; and re-globalization 
need to be tested to avoid mistakes done in the past that led to the misuse of the term 
globalization in the 1990s (for more information how the term globalization was be-
ing a buzz word in the 1990s see: O Tuathail, 2000). There are several groups of au-
thors noticing changes in the globalization processes, but are naming them differently. 
For instance, Andre Ishii (2020) states: “the current interruption of globalization 
could result in its irreversible shattering” (www.geopoliticalmonitor.com, 6/2/2020). 
Although he is not naming this interruption of globalization, he reminds us that this 
might not be the only example of such tectonic geopolitical changes in current history 
leaving up to interpretation what is his definition of globalization. After mention-
ing two World Wars and the Great Depression, he claims that they were events that 
“shattered British-led globalization” from the past (ibid.) He continues describing the 
following decades USA-led global view of the world, supported and regulated by the 
Bretton Woods System being reformed by neoliberal re-globalization initiated in the 
1970s. (ibid.) For Ishii (2020) “the four-decades long inertia of neoliberal globaliza-
tion” might be triggered by the COVID-19 crisis, slowing it down in the process 
of “firms redistributing production and supply-chains while also potentially driving 
states to onshore production of key strategic and critical products, thus emphasizing 
resiliency and security over cost-cutting” (www.geopoliticalmonitor.com, 6/2/2020). 
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De-globalization. And he is not being alone in this attempt. Brands and Gavin (2020: 
36) warn us that on the long term the COVID-19 crisis is going to be remembered 
“as an economic crisis, not as an epidemiological one”, since “it not only brought the 
global economy to a standstill—triggering the most rapid, if perhaps temporary, de-
globalization the world has ever seen—but also revealed the weaknesses of existing 
international institutions for managing the global economy and the dangerous de-
pendencies globalization had created.” (Brands and Gavin, 2020: 36) The dangerous 
dependencies they argue about are seen in uneven globalization and unfair intercon-
nections. 
The phenomena arisen out of an unevenly globalized world in a constant change 
are threefold: “the interconnections of territory, the multiplication of actors, and the 
fragmentation of power” (Zorko, 2018:25-26). And while those processes have been 
visible for some time now, the COVID-19 crisis amplified them and showed their 
true faces. The interconnections of territory stand for uneven globalization and un-
even links and interconnections, multiplication of actors refers to the rise of actors 
other than states in the international arena, and the fragmentation of power stands 
for the subsequent division of power between those new subjects. Geographical and 
geopolitical patterns of interconnections called globalization show a variety of imper-
fections and discontent in global world order. Brands and Gavin (2020: 48) noted 
that “complicating matters is the fact that COVID occurred amid a growing dissat-
isfaction with the effects of globalization and interdependence.” Such dissatisfaction 
with Over-globalization existed previously to the pandemic crisis, but the crisis un-
derlined the weaknesses and flaws of the world system. Some authors call the current 
type of globalization Hyper-globalization (Rodik, 2020). Brands and Gavin (2020: 
50) noticed the fact “that globalization proved surprisingly fragile in the face of a rag-
ing pandemic—even countries within the European Union barred exports of critical 
goods and shut their borders… (but) … The good news is that certain aspects of the 
system have worked fairly well. Similar to the 2007–9 global financial crisis, the US 
Federal Reserve acted as the banker to the world during the pandemic, providing 
much-needed liquidity to avoid a depression (albeit with less global coordination).” 
Kori Schake (2020: 635) questions forms of a “more globalized world” by asking 
whether we reached “The End of Globalization”. Schake recognized that the pan-
demic “has brought some elements of globalization to a screeching halt: movement 
of people across national boundaries has been completely stopped, shipping goods 
contracted to a tenth of their volume, and global supply chains have been revealed and 
questioned as countries limit export of medications, holding onto them instead for 
national consumption.” (Schake, 2020: 653) Nevertheless, Schake confirms previous 
notions of world being Over-globalized turning now towards De-globalized but not 
only because of the pandemic crisis. The COVID-19 crisis only emphasized “trends 
left after 2008 global financial crisis in the area of cross-border investments, convert-






















ibility, geopolitical opportunities, cross-border data transmissions or research for arti-
ficial intelligence”. (Schake, 2020: 655) Bearing in mind the effects of current state of 
globalization Brands et al (2020: 589) calls it “paradoxical” because “pandemics have 
happened in eras of far less globalization than our own. Yet the intensely intercon-
nected nature of the modern world is one reason this disease went in just weeks from 
being a ‘problem for China’ to a global mega-crisis.” 
Re-globalization is therefore a call for rearrangement of dysfunctional or unjust inter-
connections in the global order, which may boost security challenges in contemporary 
world. Brands et al (2020) finds an opportunity in this turning point as it could 
“create opportunities to pursue a smarter, more geopolitically savvy globalization, to 
reinvest in partnerships with liberal democracies, and to forge a stronger counter-
balancing coalition against a neo-totalitarian China.” (Brands and Gavin, 2020: 39) 
Or, as Schake (2020: 674) suggests “the experience of the pandemic should occasion 
reconsideration of what Nick Eberstadt terms “global integration without solidarity.” 
Re-globalization on regional principles overcomes a territorial gap in globalization 
processes caused by the politics of non-movement due to different crises. Re-emerging 
globalization, as Steinberg (2020: 599) reminds us “will increasingly occur within 
rather than across geopolitical lines”, and therefore bottom-up regional globalization 
due to the geographic proximity is more likely to occur in the post-COVID era.
2.2. Second geopolitical game – new subjects and new types of subjectivity: 
       The geopolitics of vaccine and The New Global Order? New positions in
       old Power Games
This geopolitical game could be summarized around the terms of vaccine nationalism 
and power gaining issues, the coalitions of help providers not by need but by alli-
ances, strategic humane actions and selective aid provision. The term vaccine national-
ism was used in the State of the Union speech addressing potential games related to 
research, development and distribution of COVID-19 vaccine. Ursula von der Leyen 
stated several times that “the vaccine must be deployed at an affordable price to ‘every 
single corner of the world’.” (www.politico.eu, 7/29/2020). Such notions were now 
confirmed in her speech: “none of us will be safe until all of us are safe – wherever we 
live, whatever we have. An accessible, affordable and safe vaccine is the world’s most 
promising way to do that. At the beginning of the pandemic, there was no funding, no 
global framework for a COVID vaccine – just the rush to be the first to get one. This 
is the moment the EU stepped up to lead the global response.” (State of the Union…, 
2020) No matter the mechanisms of collaboration being established, some countries 
are still insisting on individual attempts. 
The situation around R&D attempts and vaccine could be easily divided into three 
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ered around the COVAX global facility attempting to find and distribute vaccine 
evenly. Only EU “contributed 400 million euro to help ensure that safe vaccines are 
available not only for those who can afford it – but for everyone who needs it. (be-
cause) Vaccine nationalism puts lives at risk. Vaccine cooperation saves them.” (State 
of the Union…, 2020) Nevertheless, the participation in COVAX is voluntary and 
some of the countries included in the project are continuing bilateral agreements for 
COVID-19 vaccine in parallel arrangements. Furlong (2020) noticed, “trade-off isn’t 
lost on wealthy nations, which are beginning to express interest in COVAX. However, 
some countries have continued to agree bilateral deals, leading to concern that coun-
tries could be negotiating twice for the same vaccines. How exactly a vaccine would be 
distributed if a government has both a bilateral deal with a manufacturer and is part of 
COVAX is unclear”. (www.politico.eu, 7/29/2020) Not to mention that in the CO-
VAX system it is left unclear on which principles the distribution is going to be done 
once the vaccine reaches national level of distribution. The questions whether vaccine 
should be reserved for medical care workers and/or the elderly, whether it should be 
distributed to general population on voluntary basis, or how is any type of distribu-
tion going to reflect poor people, minorities, migrants of people without medical care 
still remains unanswered. So, even the plan invoking the global solidarity principle 
has its flaws and has to be further considered. But as Brands and Gavin (2020: 54) 
stated, the pandemic crisis has shown advantages of cooperation “and revealed under-
lying strengths of the current world order. For example, the unprecedented sharing 
of scientific information and the drive for therapies and a vaccine remind us of the 
breathtaking economic, intellectual, and scientific advances that have occurred in re-
cent decades”.
The second group could be called “vaccine nationalism” (State of the Union…, 2020) 
and consists of individual R&D attempts by major powers, finding the vaccine as 
an opportunity to strengthen its position in the current global order. USA, China, 
Russia and even UK strive above the care for human health – it is becoming a tool 
for possible gaining of world power and leadership position. Parallel to R&D those 
countries are conducting bilateral negotiations with major pharmaceutical companies 
developing the vaccine and insisting on primacy for distribution. Some authors also 
define this process as a form of cooperation. Inglesby (2020: 175) noticed, “with an 
extraordinary number of COVID-19 vaccine projects under way, this is the biggest 
and fastest vaccine development project in history. The major lines of effort are being 
funded by the United States, China, and an international collaboration run by the 
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations in a partnership with WHO—all 
working in partnership with biotech or leading global vaccine companies.” No matter 
if called a partnership, a cooperation on the biggest project in history, or geopolitical 
games around vaccine development, this category is about vaccine serving multiple 
purposes other than human health. Thinking about vaccine trough economic or geo-
political lenses allows it to become a tool, or even a weapon. Vaccine “is not purely 






















about protecting a population’s health. As many experts see it, a vaccine is also vital 
in getting economies back on track.” (www.politico.eu, 7/29/2020) And the very mo-
ment vaccine is being perceived as a tool for economy recovery, each player starts to 
play its own geopolitical game.
The third category consists of countries that are on the margins of the current global 
geopolitical order (e.g. Cuba); non-state actors (e.g. multinational companies or even 
individuals); and terrorist groups. And while the latter have no capabilities in R&D 
sector for vaccine development and production, they might potentially influence its 
distribution. Non-state actors, namely multinational pharmaceutical and medical 
supply companies, will hugely benefit out of their prior bilateral or even multilateral 
agreements. Cuba serves as an example for individual player in this area. The notion 
of SOBERANA-1 anti-COVID-19 vaccine being developed in Cuba put this coun-
try among 30 world leaders in R&D and made it the only country in Latin America 
with such a possibility. Although not quietly recognized as an equal player among 
leading nations, Cuban program is being grounded in the long tradition of invest-
ment in medical education in Cuba, and “despite the economic blockade and limited 
resources, Cuba maintains its education and health systems free and is conducting 
clinical trials of its own vaccine against COVID-19, SOBERANA-01” (Haro Sly, 
2020, www.americalatina.net. br, 9/28/2020). Eventually, SOBERANA-2 was also 
developed and reached phase 2 of testing by December 2020 (Zimmer, Corum and 
Wee, 2021). Interestingly, SOBERANA means SOVEREIGN and implicates the in-
tentions for positioning in the ongoing global vaccine game. Other countries on the 
margins of the global order do not have capacities to engage in global competition, 
but wild cards are always possible. 
There are 73 vaccine candidates that have started clinical trials as of late February 
2021 (WHO, 2021), a substantial and rapid increase from 36 in late September 2020 
(WHO, 2020b). These trials are usually conducted in three phases1 of increasing cost 
and complexity before being approved for use. The urgency of the COVID-19 pan-
demic brought about this vast number of simultaneous attempts to produce a vaccine, 
whereby the best global scientific centers are essentially competing to produce a solu-
tion. Table 1 summarizes the most advanced vaccines. The first column shows the 
vaccines that have reached Phase 3 trials, while the second column shows those that 
have also reached limited approval (although not yet completing Phase 3).
According to Zimmer, Corum and Wee (2021), the most widely quickly developed 
and accepted vaccines as of 26 February 2021 are:
1 In practice, greater variety is possible with an optional exploratory Phase 0, a post market Phase 4, sub-
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•	 Comirnaty, developed by Pfizer and BioNTech (USA/Germany) which is fully 
approved in 5 states (Bahrain, Brazil, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland) 
and approved for emergency use in 31 entities, counting EU as a single entity 
(ibid), which suggests some form of approval in 62 states altogether.
•	 AZD1222/Covishield, developed by the University of Oxford and AstraZeneca 
(UK/Sweden) is approved for emergency use in 32 entities, counting EU as a 
single entity (ibid) and suggesting some form of approval in 58 states altogether.
•	 Sputnik V, developed by Gamaleya Research Institute (at the Russian Ministry of 
Health), which is approved for use in Russia and approved for emergency use in 
36 entities (ibid), which is 37 entities altogether.
•	 mRNA-1273, developed by Moderna (USA), later in partership with National 
Institutes of Health (USA), which is fully approved in Switzerland and approved 
for emergency use in 10 entities, again counting EU as a single entity (ibid) and 
suggesting some form of approval in 37 states altogether.
•	 BBIBP-CorV, developed by Sinopharm (China) is fully approved in Bahrain, 
UAE and China, and approved for emergency or limited use in 12 other countries 
(ibid), suggesting some form of approval in 15 states altogether.
•	 CoronaVac, developed by Sinovac (China) is fully approved in China and ap-
proved for emergency use in 12 other states (ibid) suggesting some form of ap-
proval in 13 states altogether.
Geopolitical faultlines clearly play a role in vaccine approvals, and approvals of Sput-
nik V seem to be indicative of this. The only EU member to approve this vaccine as 
of 26 February 2021 is Hungary (which is incidentally also the only EU member to 
approve one of the vaccines developed in China). Apart from Hungary, the only other 
NATO member to approve Sputnik V is Montenegro. It was approved by Republika 
Srpska, but not the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it seems to be the only vac-
cine approved for use in Iran (although Iran is developing its own vaccines and has 
partnered with Cuba for phase 3 testing of Soberana-2) and Venezuela (ibid).
Some commenters have framed this competition in terms of specific varieties of capi-
talism and their effects on innovation. Market-oriented economies (like USA, UK 
or Australia) are more prone to radical innovation, while more strategically oriented 
economies (like Germany, Sweden or Japan) are more likely to produce steady and 
incremental innovations2. As vaccines and cures are “more likely to represent radical 
innovation, its origin will supposedly be naturally found in one of the market-oriented 
developed economies” (The Economist, 9/12/2020:66). However, varieties of capitalist 
2 This dichotomy between two major varieties of capitalism is usually rendered as Liberal Market Econo-
mies (LMEs) and Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) and has been an influential strand of literatu-
re since Hall and Soskice (2001). The types of innovation are embedded in broader incentive structures 
provided by complementary institutions. For more, see Lučev and Babić (2013).






















attempt to describe business as usual, while the present situation is better described 
as an urgent scramble for a desperately needed result. Funds and other resources that 
might not otherwise be available are now focused on the vaccine. The first effective and 
safe vaccines may have the benefit in obvious and economic terms (profiting from ex-
tremely high demand), but also in terms of political benefits for the country of origin.
2.3. Third geopolitical game – new distribution and fragmentation of power:  
       The game of Securitization
Distribution of power in crisis situations does not only affect interstate relations and 
change in global order, but power-shifts on micro-regional levels generate chances and 
challenges for global players as well. Securitization in times of the pandemic is visible 
in non-security sectors, as well as in security sector on nation-state level; it is being 
confirmed and multiplied trough politics and media; and as a consequence invokes 
global competition. 
As Steinberg (2020:547) noticed “the twin, interrelated crises of COVID-19 and the 
breakdown of economic globalization have demonstrated both the weakness of current 
‘world order’ (or perhaps the lack of world order) and the urgent need for some kind of 
framework to manage these and future challenges going forward.” But, the framework 
that is currently being used worldwide, no matter the challenge in question, is the one 
of securitization. Securitization of an issue has wide benefits for political elites: it gives 
them tools and mechanisms for action; it strengthens their position on national level; 
and, if successful in playing the war game, gives the recognition or even better position 
on international level. On the other hand, securitization may lead to the hardening of 
a political view and orientation, radicalization, militarization and undermining of a 
humane perspective or even human rights. Righteous warriors leading the war against the 
Virus gain individual political points both on national level – bolstering the position for 
next elections – as well as on international level in being recognized as successful world 
leaders. Ishii (2020) noticed “traditionalist expression of religions have returned … the 
post-COVID-19 world may face long-term consequences that not only affect immedi-
ate geopolitical configurations and alter domestic balances of power and even funda-
mental worldviews. This may be an especially pressing element for states where more 
binary-entrenching extreme political views have taken deeper root (including those in 
the West)”. Akkerman (2020: 1) also recognized “racist media outlets, organizations, 
far-right parties and governments (US, Israel, Brazil, Iran, Hungary) have used the crisis 
to stoke xenophobic sentiments”. Even before the pandemic crisis there have been no-
tions of coexistence in “a multipolar world whose aims and values no longer necessarily 
align with those of liberal democracy. At this moment, 54% of the world’s population 
now lives under some form of authoritarian rule. The COVID-19 pandemic has only 
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One of the consequences of securitization is over-militarization. The already mentioned 
border fortifying processes around the globe are being accompanied by military engage-
ment. Akkerman (2020: 1) finds “border militarization has intensified using the excuse 
of COVID-19, leading to increased troops and hardware deployed on many borders 
worldwide (US, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil, Greece, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, North Macedonia, Portugal, Slovakia and Slove-
nia)”. Political elites are not the only winners in this securitization game. Multinational 
companies, corporations, IT and biometric firms “continued to receive record levels 
of border control contracts … many of the companies winning contracts for surveil-
ling, monitoring and tracking migrants have also pitched their same technologies for 
health and policing related to COVID-19. They will be one of the few winners of the 
COVID-19 fuelled border militarization bonanza.” (Akkerman, 2020: 1) Brands and 
Gavin (2020: 44) anticipate potential change in this trend only after soft security threats 
will be perceived as more important than hard security ones, or in case “COVID ends 
up killing, just within the United States, a number of people that is orders of magnitude 
higher than the number that died on 9/11”. Unfortunately their claim that “the military 
balance of power is becoming passé” (2020: 45) is neither being followed by practical 
examples nor will it be until soft security challenges are de-securitized.
This imbalance between types of security threats belonging to soft security and hard 
security mechanisms that follow them tackle the above-mentioned thesis on contem-
porary subjectivity in IR, geopolitics and security studies. Overlapping spectrum of 
global threats, national security mechanisms, and human security protection leaves 
space for unpreparedness in planning, uncertainty of measures, and possibility of vio-
lating human rights. There is no either/or approach to contemporary challenges – a 
vicious circle of securitization on behalf of politics and to the cost of security needs to 
be broken. Brands and Gavin (2020: 45) see an enlightening opportunity that “the 
real takeaway from COVID may be that hard and soft threats often work in tandem, 
potentially mixing and combining in powerful ways. Geopolitical rivalry may make 
transnational threats harder to combat; transnational threats can sharpen geopolitical 
rivalries and instability.” Therefore, only thinking outside the box of national security 
paradigms could address global threats and secure individuals. 
3. Towards New Global Order: Self-sufficiency, Autarchy and the Ensuring   
    State Concept vs. Global Solidarity Concept
Warnings from scholars are that the COVID-19 crisis started and will end as a food 
security crisis. Jessica Fanzo (2020: 309) reminds “COVID-19 Began as a Food Sys-
tem Risk”. Due to local eating habits a zoonosis ended in a pandemic and therefore 
showed fragility in the current food security system. Lockdown and closed borders 
worldwide during the pandemic crisis highlighted the importance of national self-
sufficiency related to food. And while medical supplies were a matter of international 
bargaining and aid, food became the core of the ensuring state concept. This is the 






















concept introduced by Anthony Giddens (2009) explaining how state should be the 
first and ensuring component in the fight against climate changes. The pandemic 
crisis showed similar tendencies – states turning towards own production, local sup-
ply chains proved to be the only functional ones and the state financially encouraged 
a switch in industries that were made surplus over night. And, “while stocks are ad-
equate, the downstream effects along the food supply chain are showing vulnerabili-
ties and disruptions; some are calling to move away from long globalized food supply 
chains to short local supply chains.” (Fanzo, 2020: 313)
The question that remains is whether such trend will leave its impact in the post-
COVID time and if states would seek for comforting solutions in autarchy and self-
sufficiency. Jill Hobbs (2020:1) considers whether “the COVID‐19 pandemic will 
have longer-lasting effects on the nature of food supply chains, including the growth 
of the online grocery delivery sector, and the extent to which consumers will prioritize 
‘local’ food supply chains” finding it very likely to happen as a bottom-up process of 
demand. Theses against the ensuring state concept are those recognizing the fact states 
are unable to provide solely the solutions in the areas of “technology, climate, and 
food. In each of these areas, purely national solutions to accelerating challenges are 
unworkable. And in each of these areas, COVID-19 has highlighted the urgency of 
action.” (Brands and Gavin, 2020: 35) Jessica Fanzo (2020: 326) recognizes the nece-
ssity of “World Order for Food Security” since “none of technical recommendations to 
fix food systems is sustainable in the current fractured and sclerotic global politically 
enabling environment”. She argues, “for food systems to function effectively, equita-
bly, and sufficiently during the pandemic and long after, the political environment 
must embrace global cooperation and inclusion, support private sector engagement, 
and minimize political polarization and geopolitical competition.” (Fanzo, 2020: 326) 
Such call for a global solidarity concept has human security approach in its merits. Food 
and water are both being strategic resources as well as human life necessities. Food 
and water scarcity should not serve as a tool for geopolitical games since insecurities 
related to those resources generate insecurities on global level, even wars. At the same 
time being an essence for human lives, both food and water may serve as a powerful 
weapon. Fanzo (2020: 307) argues, “food security is highly correlated with interna-
tional security. Lasting food insecurity has been shown to lead to social unrest, food 
riots, radicalization, instability, and conflict.” Moreover, already existing food related 
instabilities were triggered by the pandemic crisis and lead towards “a potential hun-
ger pandemic” (www.geopoliticalmonitor.com, 6/2/2020). Ishii (2020) reminds us of 
numbers and consequences: “the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) has 
warned in April of a nutritional crisis that may engulf regions of the world resulting 
in up to 265 million people experiencing starvation by the end of 2020 … inflation 
in food prices has been determined as a factor in instigating ‘Arab Spring’ revolts that 
toppled MENA governments early in the last decade, geopolitical ripples resulting 
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4. Economy trends of geopolitical games and New Normal Global Order
Intellectual tradition and policy prescriptions concerning international trade have had 
a tumultuous past. Protectionism in one form or another was present at the forefront 
in various periods. In terms of intellectual tradition it would include mercantilist 
thought, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich Liszt, John Maynard Keynes, import sub-
stitution development and structuralism to the tune of Prebisch-Singer and world 
systems analysis. Trade liberalism was, however, more successful both in terms of theo-
retical and practical domination. Its tradition stems at least from Adam Smith, and 
continues via David Ricardo, Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, to be made subtler through 
the New trade theory of the late 1970s. It is safe to say that amongst policy experts 
free-market ideas are currently prevalent. In 2012, a panel of 41 top economic experts 
was surveyed on the influence of free trade and unsurprisingly, 85% either agreed or 
strongly agreed on overwhelming free trade benefits, and none disagreed (IGM Eco-
nomic Experts Panel, 2012). 
In terms of practice, free trade has made gradual gains in the West since World War 
2. Restraints on free trade (customs and quotas) and other obstructions of interna-
tional economic flows have been gradually lifted through GATT, IMF and WTO. 
The process expanded and intensified in the 1990s. Firstly, the fall of the Iron Cur-
tain heralded the expansion of global supply chains through the inclusion of Central 
and Eastern European socialist economies into the global economic system. China 
was also opening in order to be included on its own terms. This expanding process 
left out only few stragglers like North Korea, which still strived for the communist 
ideal of autarchy. Secondly, international economic integration became increasingly 
more regional in nature. Since the early 1990s, there was a remarkable proliferation 
of FTA (Free Trade Area), customs unions and similar arrangements (WTO, 2020), 
which provided smaller numbers of trading partners with a more deeply, integrated 
economic playing field. Some critics have pointed out that such regional integrations 
obstruct the true liberal goal of global free trade and that the complex relationships 
between various partners make the world resemble a „spaghetti bowl“ (Bhagwati, 
2003: 112). 
We would do well to note the old hegemonic stability theory in the context of In-
ternational Political Economy. This theory saw international economic openness as 
a result of an existence of a single dominant power (Ravenhill, 2011:23). The „first“ 
globalization of the late 19th and early 20th century is then seen as a result of British 
domination, while the „second“ globalization in the second half of the 20th century 
is understood to be the effect of the US domination. Through these lenses, we can 
note that the various regional economic integrations are an alternative to the US-led 
post-war Bretton Woods project, in which the economy of the West hinged on the 
economy of USA. In this sense, regional integrations (led by the imperfect example of 






















the European Union) are a result of the waning of US competitiveness and a lack of 
its interest to further the global free trade agenda. However, the levels already reached 
by the mid 1990s and the establishment of WTO provided an already free playing 
field for international trade, which grew even more liberal within various regional 
integrations.
All of this provides us with a view of globalization of the past decades as a complex 
phenomenon in which free-trade ideas are intertwined with an increasingly multi-
polar world. The economic reality was a continued liberalization at the intersection 
of two tendencies (global and regional) and the result was the ever-developing global 
supply chain. Economic processes ended up in a mesh of geography and economy due 
to the availability of production locations and markets across the world. Companies 
founded since the early 1990s could easily be “born global”, or founded expressly with 
the goal of functioning in the globalizing economy, rather than in the confines of a 
single national economy (Dicken, 2007; Ietto-Gillies, 2005). However, this also con-
tributed to the vulnerability of the entire world to events in a specific location. Such 
a world - globalized, liberal, mutually embedded and market-oriented as it was – met 
with three types of shocks in recent years. All of these worked to subvert some of its 
crucial elements. Firstly, the global financial crisis and recession of 2008/09 provided a 
reminder of the inherent vulnerability and caused some countries to pursue alternative 
growth models. Most notably, China reoriented from a heavily export-driven path to 
an increasingly domestic consumption oriented one (for more see Lučev, 2021: 247-
253). This is a form of structural decoupling in which economic ties and possibilities 
may remain the same as they were, but the importance of international trade to the 
overall national economy diminishes. Secondly, in the years following the first shock, 
protectionist-minded narratives developed and were politically-operationalized. The 
most notable European result was Brexit, through which UK decided to partially 
decouple from European integrations. In USA, Donald Trump ran an „America first“ 
campaign and his administration was true to it in that it pursued trade wars since 2016 
(see Liu and Woo, 2018). Thirdly, the COVID-19 crisis that has begun developing 
since early 2020 has seen another kind of decoupling. The health risks, lockdowns and 
restrictions to international travel have produced a significant drop in global trade, 
GDP and tourism and has also created incentives to reassure some of the production 
that has been offshored to more competitive locations.
To assess the effects of such economic decoupling we must first take stock of the 
specific structural positions that specific national economies find themselves in. Table 
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Table 1.
Trade positions in selected economies (data for 2019 or most recent)
Import (%GDP) Export (%GDP) Net trade (%GDP)
USA 14.58 11.73 -2.85
Germany 41.10 46.89 +5.79
PR China 18.23 (2018) 19.04 (2018) +0.81
Canada 34.04 31.64 -2.4
France 32.75 31.77 -0.98
UK 32.68 31.60 -1.08
Japan 18.29 (2018) 18.52 (2018) +0.23
Russia 20.76 28.31 +7.55
Source: OECD, 2020; own calculation
We can observe that these countries have very different structural effects of interna-
tional trade for their economy. Firstly, the exposure to the international economy via 
trade is diverse with trade (exports + imports) representing as much as 88% GDP in 
Germany3, and as little as 26.3% in USA. As we have already noted, the structural 
importance of trade in China has underwent a substantial decline in recent years. In 
2006 its combined exports and imports were equal to 64.4% GDP, while in 2018 
they were equal to only 37.3% (OECD, 2020), which is a testament to the radical 
reorientation of the growth model4. Secondly the countries in Table 1 diverge on 
the macroeconomic effects of trade as well. The net trade as a percentage of GDP 
reflects the structural importance of trade deficits or trade surpluses. The US trade 
deficit equivalent to 2.6% GDP by definition means that the US economy is 2.6% 
smaller than it would have been in the case of a balanced trade position. The deficits 
were substantially larger before the last crisis (5.5% GDP in 2006), but they remain 
irritating and provide some motivation for an attempt to reduce them. However, free 
trade provides various static and dynamic benefits including overall larger economies, 
greater efficiency and lower prices and global supply chains have grown so complex 
that an increase in trade restrictions may be tantamount to a shock to the markets. 
These are some of the reasons why the economic mainstream is in favor of free trade, 
as we have noted. Nevertheless, it is clear to see that countries with large trade deficits 
would be more likely to develop protectionist narratives and policies, as the short-
term political motivations develop in a different atmosphere compared to countries 
that run trade surpluses. One such country is Germany, whose position within the EU 
helps it to form substantial and continued trade surpluses (5.8% GDP in 2019). This 
3 This is by no means a record, as smaller economies are often more dependent on international trade 
which represents 381.6% of GDP in Luxemburg, 239.2% in Ireland and 185.2% Slovakia (OECD, 
2020)
4 In the same period, this figure rose by 10.6 percentage points in Germany, and dropped by 0.6 in USA.






















is the mirror image of the US situation, as German economy would be smaller, and 
its unemployment larger if it (ceteris paribus) had a balanced trade position. China is 
currently in between these two positions, with its erstwhile very large surplus (8.7% 
GDP in 2007) reduced to 0.8% GDP in 2018. However, it remains a winner in in-
ternational markets and its short-term motivations are clearly different to those found 
in USA. We should bear this context in mind when approaching the issue of the trade 
war of recent years. 
As we have seen, there are short-term political motivations to recent US protection-
ism. However, the rise of China and its strategies of “Made in China 2025” (increas-
ing the technological complexity of Chinese manufacturing) and “Belt and Road” 
(actively developing closer economic ties with much of the rest of the world) may have 
caused some hegemonic apprehension in USA (Kim, 2019; Kwan, 2020). However, 
the results of this form of decoupling are not yet entirely visible – even as it can be sur-
mised, they have hurt both parties. Itakura (2020) uses a general equilibrium model 
to assess the effects of the 2018/19 trade war and estimates the losses to the GDPs of 
China (−1.41%) and USA (−1.35%) as similar.
In such a context, the crisis connected with the responses to the COVID-19 pandemic 
has begun developing. Its final results in terms of growth cannot yet be fully known. 
Table 2 brings the current IMF estimates for real GDP growth in 2020 and 2021 as 
well as data for growth achieved in 2019.
Table 2.
Real growth in % in selected economies for 2019, and current IMF estimates for 2020 and 2021
2019 growth 2020 growth (January 2021 estimate)
2021 growth (January 
2021 estimate)
USA 2.2 -3.6 5.1
Germany 0.6 -5.4 3.5
PR China 6.0 2.3 8.1
Canada 1.9 -5.5 3.6
France 1.5 -9.0 5.5
UK 1.4 -10.0 4.5
Japan 0.3 -5.1 3.1
Russia 1.3 -3.6 3.0
Source: IMF, 2021
China stands out, as its growth in 2019 was very strong by Western standards. Al-
though it represents a continuation of a worrisome trend in slowing growth from the 
Chinese point of view (the new normal), used as it is to decades of higher rates of 
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mies have had unimpressive growth in 2019 (except USA, whose 2.2% is high by 
its historic standards), and the estimated growth rates for this year vary significantly. 
Overall, IMF’s estimates for growth in 2020 have continuously and significantly im-
proved in each new database update. The GDP contraction in USA for 2020 was 
estimated at -3.6% in January 2021, which is a substantial improvement from the 
estimate of -8% made in June 2020. In the same interval, Russia was upgraded to 
-3.6% from -6.6% and France to a still disastrous -9% from -12.5%. If the growth 
estimates for next year should prove correct, 2021 growth will only somewhat alleviate 
the global economic situation. China stands out once again, as it did not experience a 
contraction in 2020 at all, but should benefit from stronger growth in 2021 nonethe-
less.
These contractions are also under the influence of waning trade, the trends of which 
are also under the influence of an adverse situation of recent years. US merchandise ex-
ports experienced a particularly troubling April and May –dropping by 32.7% in this 
period (while usual seasonal fluctuations in previous years were in the 4-6% range), 
and while there were improvements in future months, the most recent data currently 
available (for November 2020) still show merchandise exports which are 7.3% lower 
than November 2019, and 9.5% lower than November 2018. US imports seem to be 
recovering more quickly and this may result in further issues for the trade deficit. The 
growth of Chinese exports was comparatively unproblematic. In the same March-May 
2020 period, they grew by 11.8% and the most recent data (for December 2020) 
show an increase of 18.1% compared with December 2019, and a 27.7% increase 
compared with December 2018. Quite opposite from the US case, imports grew at a 
slower rate and December 2020 shows an increase of 6.5% compared to December 
2019 and an increase of 24.2% compared to December 2018 (own calculations from 
WTO, 2021). All of this leaves China in a relatively favorable position. Its increasing 
resilience on domestic markets in its growth helps it to reduce structural vulnerability 
to international markets. The nominal value of its exports is increasing nonetheless, 
and its growth prospects are relatively optimistic.
5. Instead of Conclusion: COVID-19 scenarios and Global Order(s)
The analysis of New World Order(s) is often used in methods of prediction in IR. In 
contrast, geopolitical scenarios do not predict future events following known trends 
but insist on the analysis of the influence of unpredictable factors, so called Black 
Swans (Taleb, 2009) or Wild Cards. As Balaman defined “scenario analysis is con-
ducted, to analyse the impacts of possible future events on the system performance 
by taking into account several alternative outcomes, i.e., scenarios, and to present 
different options for future development paths resulting in varying outcomes and cor-
responding implications” (Balaman, 2019: 137). Although coming from the field of 
engineering Balaman summarizes the essence of this qualitative method that includes 






















demographical, geographical, economic, political, and resource data combining it 
with STEEP (social, technical, economic, environmental, political) trends (Bradfield 
et. all, 2005). The advantages this method generates are the inclusion of unpredictable 
factors like alternative futures, changes in values, unprecedented rules or discoveries 
(Mendonca et. all, 2009). Gausemeier et. all (1998) introduced the term dynamic 
scenarios. Combining uncertainties and givens (Meinert, 2014) scenario analysis offers 
alternative worlds in near future due to the analysed phenomenon. 
Existing scenarios (Bobbit, 2020; Steil, 2020; Stainberg, 2020; The Economist) ana-
lyse the consequences that the pandemic underlined as non-functional in the current 
world order. For instance Philip Bobbitt (2020) offers a future scenario of a deepen-
ing crisis of constitutional order in major nation-states. Brands and Gavin (2020: 38) 
agree since “world orders are, to a great extent, a reflection of the policies and values 
of the most powerful global actors.” They believe that “COVID has revealed signifi-
cant weaknesses in the post–Cold War order” (Brands and Gavin, 2020: 38). Benn 
Steil (2020) models for US post-pandemic foreign economic policy include economy-
based scenarios that influence global economy system. The first one is One World, in 
which USA and China “can coexist on a mutually beneficial basis within a set of com-
mon rules, norms, and institutions governing economic exchange.” (385). The second 
model named Isolationism, stands for a long-lasting doctrine of non-involvement in 
international “alliances, foreign economic commitments, [or] international agree-
ments” (392). The third presented model Two Worlds calls upon Cold War practice 
against a new enemy – China – and could lead to “progressive multilateral decoupling 
– an escalating quarantining of Chinese firms and industries that persist in either il-
legal activities (such as espionage and theft) or unfair trade practices (like dumping 
to eliminate competition)” with a simultaneous construction of “a new multilateral 
trade regime”(399). 
James B. Steinberg (2020) created two scenarios: a pessimistic and an optimistic one. 
He argues “negative scenario is not hard to envision; it seems that almost every analyst 
of global politics has described some variation of this outcome. Even assuming that 
the pandemic does go away – that we are in a world after COVID-19 rather than a 
world of COVID-19 – this scenario involves dramatic regression along four key axes: 
1. The rollback of globalization; 2. Decisive and adverse shifts in the balance of power; 
3. The erosion and perhaps collapse of the liberal order; and 4. The decline of democ-
racy and the ascent of illiberalism and populism.” (Steinberg, 2020: 594-599). On the 
other hand, positive scenario includes similar notions but with opposite outcomes: “1. 
The pandemic leads not to de-globalization but to re-globalization along geopoliti-
cal lines; 2. The pandemic does not result in dramatic, adverse shifts in the balance 
of power; 3. The liberal order holds and is revitalized; and 4. The pandemic proves 
deadlier for autocrats and populists than for democrats” (Steinberg, 2020: 599-608). 
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pandemic a turning point? explaining their stands on future events related to the coro-
navirus. It is believed this crisis “will sharpen great power rivalries and hasten the shift 
in the global balance of power from west to east. … pandemic will not usher in an 
entirely new global order, but it will change things in three important ways: 1. It will 
bring to the surface developments that had previously gone largely unnoticed, such 
as the way in which China has already established spheres of influence in parts of the 
world that receive little attention; 2. It will act as an accelerant of existing geopolitical 
trends, in particular the growing rivalry between the US and China and the shift in 
the economic balance of power from West to East; 3. Finally, it is likely to be a catalyst 
for changes that are presently difficult to predict, in both the developed and develop-
ing world, from the future of the EU to the relationship between many developing 
countries and China.” (The Economist..., September 2020: 1) 
Each of summarized scenarios has similar characteristics – they invoke new order but 
disagree about its reach; they announce shift in power but disagree about its direction; 
and introduces new models disagreeing about its form. Therefore, instead of a conclu-
sion, authors summon-up a vision of three possible scenarios due to the previously 
explained geopolitical games and its economic consequences.
5.1. Already known games: The rich are getting richer, the poor are getting   
       poorer in a Cold War-like competition
For Brands and Gavin it seems unlikely that COVID will have transformative effects 
on the current architecture of world order but “when it comes to institutions, the 
pandemic has undoubtedly revealed deep-seated weaknesses within many prominent 
international bodies, from the WHO and WTO to the G7. The need for reform has 
become clear to all; so has the absence of well-developed institutional structures to 
deal with a variety of emerging challenges.” (Brands and Gavin, 2020: 43) Therefore, 
“COVID may simply spur a period of much-needed institutional reform and evolu-
tion rather than a new start.” (Brands and Gavin, 2020: 44) Bobbitt (2020: 146) re-
minds us of something called “Westphalian Fallacy”. The constitutional order of states 
and state system “has not changed since 1648 and is unlikely to do so now.”(ibid.)
Ongoing competition for world power between USA and China vigorously reminds 
of the Cold War framework for actions in international community. And while some 
authors find that challenging; (e.g., Ferguson (2020: 821) “Cold War II will be the 
biggest challenge to world order”); we find it a soothing possibility for international 
relations because it is easy to manage a system you already know. Yes, technical possi-
bilities are changing, subtle hybrid warfare mechanisms emerging, and new battlefields 
open daily. But, other than uncertainty in balance of competition and cooperation 
(Brands and Gavin, 2020), Cold War is an old game with known possible outcomes, 
not to remind it was actually a time of peace, at least on global level (Woods, 1994). 






















In this first introduced scenario, Stiel’s (2020: 399) notion of “Two Worlds” lives up 
to its full potential.
5.2. Shock and Surprise: Black Swans in research and development of the   
       vaccine, hybrid warfare and Global Chaos 
Andre Ishii (2020) got the impression trough media that “the pandemic is halting 
history’s drive towards a tectonic geopolitical convulsion, which was seemingly the 
trend since the beginning of the roaring 20s of this century” (www.geopoliticalmoni-
tor.com, 6/2/2020). But although it seems big shock ups are possible, they are se-
lectively plausible. The possibilities for tectonic changes in world order depend on 
unprecedented possibilities for action of non-state actors or states on the margin of 
current geopolitical order. Nevertheless, rouge states disconnected from world order 
do not have shared knowledge in R&D, capacity of finance for individual vaccine 
development, in which case it could be found only by surprise. Non-state actors, for 
example terrorist groups, could possibly interfere with the process of distribution of 
the vaccine, or induce different shake-ups in cyberspace warfare, both of which are not 
actions that lead to tectonic changes. 
Core changes in world order are possible in the current status quo of the pandemic cri-
sis as well. McTague (2020) predicts worrying consequences of possible second-wave 
“the prospect of the disease taking hold in a developing G20 country – think India 
– which could see the virus quickly doubling back to Europe and the U.S.; the un-
certain impact of technological advances in fields such as artificial intelligence as they 
are used to help combat the disease’s spread; a recession pulling at the ties between 
the European Union’s poor south and wealthy north.” (The Atlantic, www.theatlantic.
com, 9/24/2020). 
Finally, a predicted scenario of global chaos is expected in case new Cold War ends 
rapidly in favor of China. McTague (2020) imagines a scenario where on the breach 
of feeling safe in Western world, COVID “takes hold in the developing world. Ex-
hausted, indebted, and desperate for their own economies to get back up to speed, 
richer countries are too slow to help. Panic ensues. Migrants mass in southern Eu-
rope, which is still struggling to pull itself out of a coronavirus-induced depression. 
Somewhere, a state defaults on debt held largely by Western financial institutions. In 
the chaos, an autocrat eyes an opportunity for a land grab. A United States already 
unwilling to take the lead leaves China to step into the void.” (The Atlantic, www.
theatlantic.com, 9/24/2020) Such scenario would lead to rapid and tectonic changes 
in global geopolitical order but only in the change of leading roles of the players. The 
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5.3. New Global Order: Re-globalization and new subjectivity
New global order induced by the crisis is the one defined by re-globalization as a 
bottom-up process, with new subjects other than states, and smart business solutions 
leading towards prosperity rather than geopolitics. Different “kinds of geopolitical 
shake-ups, combined with the COVID-19 crisis, possess the potential to radically 
accelerate the transformation of the geopolitical landscape. Add to this mix some Big 
Data-premised domestic state programs – think tech-based contact tracing that may 
find a home in wider social applications – that could also potentially alter the balance 
of power between the state and its public”. (www.geopoliticalmonitor.com, 6/2/2020) 
Such balancing power is no longer being part of global geopolitical games but locally 
and business oriented. The pandemic has altered business processes, and according 
to Robert Mikac (2020: 9) research, “it is visible that the operators used the crisis as 
the opportunity to change part of their own business processes as well as detect an 
additional number of identified lessons, which, if converted into lessons learned can 
enable a higher level of preparedness, readiness and effectiveness in dealing with future 
crises”. Resistance and resilience uploaded in collective awareness and strengthened 
by business relations and processes indeed leads to new rules and regulations in world 
order leaving it parched of geopolitical competition on state level. 
Nevertheless, Steinberg (2020) suggested three possibilities for forming a new global 
order after COVID-19. All three models are taking into account states as subjects and 
foresee world leadership by coalitions of the willing, either in institutional, ad hoc, or 
geographical way. The institutional basis of cooperation is formed around, as he calls 
it, “directorate” of “systemically important countries” that can “take on the effort to 
promote cooperation directly or to spin off new groups and arrangements to tackle 
particular challenges.”(558) The idea for the second approach is ad-hoc grouping 
around challenges and/or interest. As examples for this solution Steinberg (2020: 560) 
is naming already existing initiatives such as “Major Economies Forum (for climate 
change), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Proliferation Security Initia-
tive (PSI) (for nuclear and missile proliferation)”. Membership is such groups “need 
not be fixed”, it “can be more specifically tailored to the countries that ‘matter’ for a 
particular problem (which can vary from case to case)” and “can be expanded over 
time to include others who meet membership criteria or performance commitments.” 
(Steinberg, 2020: 560-561) The third Steinberg’s (2020: 562) approach is “to rely on 
regional organizations” due to the fact “they are smaller and may be somewhat more 
homogeneous than a universal grouping, agreement may be easier, and they offer simi-
lar advantages of being an ongoing organization that can tackle emerging problems.” 
It is not stated, but geographical proximity, belonging and tradition of cooperation 
play a significant role in such a model.
The emergence of a new global order relies on the continuance of the ongoing pro-
cesses of geopolitical realm: interconnection of territory, new subjectivity and frag-
mentation of power. The pandemic crisis highlighted rotten parts of globalization 






















calling upon easier and more logical interconnections in the regional sense. It high-
lighted the co-existence of various subjects but also left no room for their actions. State 
mechanisms of possible international cooperation (against conflict) distribute power 
in the international arena. It is left to be considered whether global wellbeing and 
solidarity might prevail current geopolitical competition around COVID-19 issues 
due to the humane approach health crisis calling upon.
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Sažetak
Istraživanje donosi dvodimenzionalnu analizu posljedica pandemije COVID-19 na globalni 
svjetski poredak nakon 2020. godine. Prva dimenzija analize orijentirana je prema geopolitič-
kim parametrima, dok se druga bazira na geoekonomskim posljedicama pandemijske krize. 
Autori su identificirali tri tipa geopolitičkih igara u međunarodnoj zajednici: igru zabrane 
kretanja i etiketiranja; igru utrke oko cjepiva i igru sekuritizacije. Cilj je istražiti njihove poten-
cijalne posljedice po gospodarstvo određenih zemalja, ali i postulate međunarodne političke 
ekonomije s obzirom na suvremene geografske, političke i ekonomske uzorke ponašanja u 
pandemiji. Središnja teza usmjerena je prema potvrđivanju predvidljivih i uobičajenih uzoraka 
ponašanja koje prate isprobani mehanizmi pokušaja ostvarivanja moći u međunarodnoj zajed-
nici (klasične geopolitičke igre moći u novim uvjetima). Glavni cilj ovog rada je izrada scenarija 
potencijalnih promjena u odnosima moći na globalnoj razini i analiza posljedica s obzirom na 
ishode triju navedenih igara. Analiza scenarija uobičajena je geopolitička kvalitativna metoda 
koja se najčešće koristi za procjenu rizika u različitim sferama društva. Najčešće se njome služe 
velike korporacije pri izračunu financijskih fluktuacija kod poslovnih procesa i pri donošenju 
odluka, ali se pojavljuje i u čitavom nizu projekcija i kod industrijsko- tehnoloških procesa i 
pri američkim institutima. Slična je metodologija i u slučajevima financijskih analiza scenarija, 
dok se u ostalim društevnim znanostima (prvenstveno geopolitici i sigurnosnim studijama) 
radi o otkrivanju potencijalnih i alternativnih svjetova. U geopolitici služi za projekciju po-
tencijalnih razvoja događaja u globalnom okruženju s obzirom na kreiranje novih svjetskih 
poredaka, te fenomene koji mogu mijenjati predviđene ishode stvarnosti. Dok se analize novih 
svjetskih poredaka mogu pripisati i metodama predviđanja u međunarodnim odnosima; za 
razliku od njih, analize scenarija nisu samo prognoze razvoja događaja utemeljene na prošlim 
trendovima. One prvenstveno uključuju razmatranja nepredvidljivih faktora odnosno obrata u 
međunarodnim odnosima, gdje je pandemija svjetskih razmjera zasiguno jedan od njih.
Ključne riječi: geopolitika, geoekonomija, pandemija, COVID-19, globalni svjetski poredak.
